Wednesday, October 21, 2015

[ILMN] Case of DNA Sequencing Blowing Up

Company of attention is Illumina, a San Diego enigma pioneering on the fast DNA sequencing "shotgun" method that revolutionized the world. Some argued they single-handedly change the course of the Human Genome Project and shorten the time needed in years if not decades.

Anyway enough of that. They are under enormous pressure recently. First is the delay of approval at the FDA, second is the revising of earning target at the recent earning call. Are they doomed?

Here is our Technical Speculator look of it:


Fib series show that today it hits multi month support level. RSI shows that it is at extreme over sold territories. Without better news soon it would tank further to around $85-90 range before stopping the bleed. And that, largely depends on the marco environment.

I just entered a position in it regardless, as I have followed this for long and waiting for a LONG position for a while already. This is an attractive price, though may not be in the short term. When it go down to $90 range we will double our holding and stay there.

Disclaimer: the author of this article holds shares in this equity and prepare to buy more in the next 60 days.

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Standard and Poors' 500

With S&P500 breaking records after records, one must wonder if we are nearing the peak, and if so, when will it burst and when it does, how bad would it be? No one can claim to know the answer of these questions, but we can have a logical approach to it.

The Standard and Poors' 500 has the following describing the composition of the index:
"The S&P 500® is widely regarded as the best single gauge of large cap U.S. equities.  There is over USD 5.14 trillion benchmarked to the index, with index assets comprising approximately USD 1.6 trillion of this total. The index includes 500 leading companies and captures approximately 80% coverage of available market capitalization."

Even though it does not represent the entire market, but it is probably close to as best as you can get, not so because the composition is accurately representative, but because of its volume and how it is perceived. In the world of finance, how one thing is perceived matters more than what it really is, especially in valuation. After all if no one wants your painting it doesn't matter if you are Picasso, right? We will treat S&P500 as representation of the market from here on.

The valuation of an financial instrument, be it a stock, a bond or an index, based largely on two things: intrinsic value that focuses on the long term capital returns, and short term extrinsic value based on how volatile and risk factors perceived to be associated with this instrument. For the latter one, human emotion has a much larger influence on it, and also because the intrinsic value is focused on longer term, and things may very well changed over time, this human emotion part on how things are perceived becomes quite important, more important than many of the fundamental analysis, value driven investors think.

Now that we have broken up the two important category, let's examine each of them. I will attempt to focus on established methods while not too much relying on any particular models to get a balanced view. Let's start with the big picture. Where are we at now?

There is a well publicized view from presumably Warren Buffer's view of stock valuation, noted in this business insider article: Warren Buffett Once Said This Was The 'Best Single Measure' Of Stock Market Value, in which this graph is particularly interesting:


And that was in January. The market has risen much since then. so what does that tell us? Fundamentally, at least from the metrics described in the article, the market is in lofty valuation, so much so that traditional models no longer apply. Or is it? This model of representation forgets about the fact that prior to 2008, there was minimal Federal Reserve intervention, in particular the Quantitative Easing (buying bonds and asset with nothing but money printed) that we now all accustomed to. How much does that affect the valuation? If we can subtract that influence, can we get a better picture of where we may be now? From the Economist article in the link, the balance of the Fed is about $4 trillion, plus $85B-$75B per month. There has been some adjustment, and supposedly the number is being tapered down month by month. So let's put the number at $4.5T for the sake of simplicity. This number is pretty accurate according to Yahoo's news on Fed's decision to continue winding down the bond purchase, of $4.4T.


Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Jefferies profit hugely down on dwindling bond trades

I see this as the another sign of profit deterioration of the low interest driven businesses, starting with mortgage lenders and now with bond traders. I expect more of this news coming up for carry trade and other currency derivative trading, and them will be car sales (due to dry up of car loans thanks to higher rate) and trickle down to the rest of economy. 

From Bloomberg Sept/17

Jefferies Profit Tumbles 83% on Plunge in Bond Trading

Jefferies Group LLC, the investment bank owned by Leucadia National Corp. (LUK), said fiscal third-quarter profit tumbled 83 percent as trading revenue fell to the lowest since the depths of the financial crisis.

Net income for the three months ended Aug. 31 dropped to $11.7 million from $70.2 million a year earlier, the New York-based firm said today in a statement. Jefferies was acquired this year by Leucadia, whose quarter ends Sept. 30.

Revenue from fixed-income trading, a unit overseen by William Jennings and Johan Eveland, plunged 88 percent to $33.1 million, bringing total revenue from buying and selling securities to $184.1 million, the lowest since the fourth quarter of 2008. The biggest Wall Street trading firms are scheduled to report third-quarter earnings in October. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), the largest U.S. bank, said this month revenue from trading could fall as much as 5 percent.

“We experienced a very challenging summer in our fixed-income businesses due to the rising-rate environment, spread widening, redemptions experienced by our client base which heavily muted trading, and related mark-to-market writedowns within our inventory,” Jefferies Chief Executive Officer Richard Handler, who also runs Leucadia, said in the statement.

Handler, 52, said earlier this year that Jefferies saw a significant slowdown in fixed-income trading during March and April resulting from concern about the tapering of the Federal Reserve’s bond-buying program. Speculation that the Fed will reduce its $85 billion in monthly buying has sent the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield to its highest level since 2011.

September Improvement

“Fixed-income markets were most unsettled in June, while July and August were more balanced,” Handler said in today’s statement. “Since Labor Day, client flows have been stronger, and fixed-income performance has markedly improved to more normal levels,” he said, referring to the U.S. holiday on Sept. 2.

Central-bank stimulus has helped drive a global equity rally, with the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) rising more than 150 percent from its bear-market low in 2009. The U.S. gauge fell as much as 4.6 percent from an Aug. 2 record as speculation increased that the Fed would begin winding down its monetary support.

“This quarter is going to be a quarter where banks differentiate themselves on how they manage risk and execute,” said Charles Peabody, an analyst at Portales Partners LLC in New York. “Execution is going to be key in differentiating who did well and who didn’t.”

Stock Trading

Jefferies’s revenue from trading stocks also declined, falling 28 percent to $151 million from the year-earlier period. Investment-banking revenue climbed 23 percent to $319.3 million amid increases in fees from underwriting and advising clients.

Jefferies recorded negative revenue from principal transactions of $24.9 million in the quarter. That compares with $297 million in revenue in the same period of 2012.

The firm marked down its investment in the former Knight Capital Group Inc. by $16 million in the fiscal third quarter amid declines in that firm’s stock price, Handler said in the statement. That mark-down was recorded in the firm’s equities net revenue, he said.

JPMorgan said last week that third-quarter revenue from trading stocks and bonds could be unchanged to down as much as 5 percent from a year earlier. September 2012 was “particularly strong, and we’re not necessarily expecting it to be as strong this year,” Chief Financial Officer Marianne Lake said at an investor conference.

Shares of Leucadia fell 0.9 percent to $28.05 at 4:15 p.m. in New York, after rising as much as 1.6 percent before earnings were released. They declined about 21 percent in the three months ended Aug. 31 amid a surge in interest rates. In that same period, yields on the benchmark 10-year Treasury climbed from 2.1 percent to 2.8 percent. The S&P 500 was little changed.

To contact the reporter on this story: Laura Marcinek in New York at lmarcinek3@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Christine Harper at charper@bloomberg.net; David Scheer at dscheer@bloomberg.net

Thursday, September 12, 2013

[Bloomberg] Paulson's Recount of the Meltdown

Lehman Brothers Abyss Had Paulson Seeking Prayer Amid Crisis

People weren’t taking Dick Fuld’s calls the weekend before Sept. 15, because Dick had been in denial for a long time.

As the chief executive officer of Lehman Brothers, he had asked the New York Fed and the Treasury weeks earlier to put capital into a pool of nonperforming illiquid mortgages that he wanted to put in a subsidiary he called SpinCo and spin off. We had explained that we had no authority to do that. He thought somehow there was something the government could do to help. How could it be that no one would want to buy his company? He just couldn’t believe it.

I was one of the few people speaking with him, and I told him what was happening: We couldn’t find a buyer, and without one, the government was powerless to save Lehman. He was devastated.

You would have to be a CEO to really understand what he was going through. He obviously loved the firm -- viewed it as his firm -- and to have it go down when you’re at the helm, there can’t be much that’s more devastating than that professionally. But the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on Sept. 15 was hardly the end of the crisis. It wasn’t the beginning, either.

Business School

My goal had never been to go to Washington. My first year at Harvard Business School, 1969, I stopped studying. I was a good enough student that I could get by, so I spent most of my time at Wellesley College with Wendy Judge and persuaded her to marry me before the second year. Wendy got a job teaching swimming in Quantico, Virginia, so I got a job at the Pentagon. The only time I had ever worn a suit was to go to church. The only management experience I had was at a summer camp in Colorado. But, remarkably, I worked on my first bailout in those days.

Lockheed (LMT) was a major defense contractor on the verge of bankruptcy, and the Nixon administration had gone to Congress to get a loan guarantee. I frankly didn’t think the government should intervene. The parts of Lockheed which were critical to the national defense could have been bought by other defense contractors, but this was hotly debated. Even then, bailouts were very unpopular.

Ask Questions

As a result of the work I had done on Lockheed, I was approached by the White House. I went to work for a man named Lewis Engman, an assistant director of the White House Domestic Council. I was very green. I had a lot of questions, and Lew was a good mentor. He said, “If someone asks you to do something, and it doesn’t seem right, ask lots of questions. And any memo you write, ask yourself not only is it the right thing, but how would it look printed on the front page of the Washington Post.” I had started work in the Nixon White House in April 1972, just a few weeks before the Watergate break-in. That was terrific advice.

It was not hard for me to decide to leave government. In January of 1974, when I joined Goldman Sachs (GS), it never occurred to me I might one day run the firm. If you were interested in management and running a big organization, you went to some industrial company. You didn’t work for an investment bank. I picked Goldman Sachs because I was really interested in the idea of multitasking, working, and advising clients in a lot of industries.

Everyone Flawed

Early on at Goldman Sachs someone said, “Hank isn’t that smart. What he really does is just assimilate and absorb information from others.” I took that as a huge compliment. I worked with many CEOs there, some really good, some not so good. I worked and advised heads of state, government leaders. What I learned was that there’s no perfect leader. Everyone is flawed, and their strengths are usually the opposite of their weakness. “Hank is candid; Hank is indiscreet.” “Hank is decisive; Hank acts too quickly.”

The essential ingredient to the success of these CEOs was the team they put around them. If you don’t put people around you to compensate for your flaws, these big jobs always uncover them.

I had turned down being secretary of the Treasury twice in the spring of 2006 when I was approached a third time in April of that year. I accepted. I didn’t really know President Bush, and I had negotiated a number of conditions to my coming, including choosing my staff. But those preconditions would mean nothing if I couldn’t build a relationship with the president. And I had a terrific boss in George Bush.

‘Wartime General’

During the financial crisis he basically said, “You’re my wartime general, and you can get to me whenever you need to. We’ll talk about any issue.” And we did. I also was very fortunate to have great partners in Ben S. Bernanke and Timothy Geithner, and our efforts benefited from an extraordinary level of trust and cooperation.

In July of 2006 the president was meeting with his economic team at Camp David. He had asked me to make a presentation on entitlement reform. Instead I asked for permission to talk about my concerns that there were real excesses in the economy. The excesses had been building up for many years, and I thought there was a high likelihood there would be a financial crisis while I was in Washington and while he was president. I talked about the over-the-counter derivative market and the lack of transparency there. I talked about the size of hedge funds. I didn’t talk about housing. When we finished the conversation, the president said, “Hank, what would cause the financial crisis?” I said, “I don’t know, sir. But after it happens, with 20/20 hindsight it will be obvious.”

Mortgage Securities

I had been in Washington for a year when the causes began to reveal themselves. The biggest French bank, BNP Paribas (BNP), had funds that held subprime-related mortgage bonds. Three of those funds were frozen. There were calls for redemption, and there was a liquidity crisis. This led to massive concern across Europe. From that time on we were on high alert.

The president’s working group on financial markets convened and focused immediately on the complexity of mortgage securities. It used to be that if I wanted a mortgage on my home, which I did in 1974, I went to the First National Bank of Chicago. If I had problems, I could have gone to them, and if there was a reasonable solution we could have done a mortgage modification. But the model had changed. We had gone to a securitization model.

Unscrupulous Brokers

Mortgages were sliced and diced, packaged in securities, and then sold in the public market around the world. Along with innovation came complexity, and complexity is the enemy of transparency. I had high school friends and grade school friends that got put into mortgages by unscrupulous brokers. Some lost their houses, and I spent time with them and looked at what they had been conned into accepting -- they didn’t understand what they were signing on for. It was despicable.

As we moved into 2008, we had a number of U.S. institutions fail. Countrywide, the biggest originator of mortgages, was bailed out with an equity investment from Bank of America. Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley all had trouble with their mortgage portfolios. None of us understood the full extent of what we were dealing with. 

On March 13, Bear Stearns told us that without assistance they would fail the next day. They’d lost $2.4 billion the previous year in bad mortgage investments. I figured somewhere in the United States of America there had to be some emergency authorities to prevent a failing investment bank from going into the normal bankruptcy process. But the Fed had no authority to guarantee liabilities or inject capital. Neither did Treasury. We needed a buyer.

$2 Shares

JPMorgan was willing to step in, supply the capital, and guarantee the trading book, but the Fed had to help facilitate that through a loan against a mortgage pool which was relatively illiquid. The original agreement was for the Bear shareholders to get $2 a share, and in order to get the deal done, they needed to get $10 a share.

A question I often get is, “Didn’t that create a moral hazard?” The argument goes something like this: If market participants presume that a government is always going to step in to save a failing institution, then those market participants will not subject that institution to the kinds of rigorous analysis and scrutiny that is needed. I had argued that the shareholders of Bear Stearns shouldn’t get more than $2 a share, and that argument was less about moral hazard than what was right.

Greater Good

If the United States of America through the Fed was making a loan to prevent a bank from failing, why should shareholders get more money? Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner argued that the greater good was preventing the failure. So I agreed to the terms. But initially I found it abhorrent.

The market turned almost immediately to Lehman Brothers, and after Bear Stearns, I was doing everything I could to encourage Dick Fuld to raise capital, to attract a strategic investor, or to sell the company. Meanwhile, Ben and I went to see Barney Frank. We needed emergency resolution authorities to keep failing investment banks out of bankruptcy, just like the government had with commercial banks. Barney said, “We won’t be able to get Congress to act unless you’re prepared to shout, ‘If we don’t get these authorities, you’re going to have an investment bank like Lehman Brothers fail and the consequences will be terrible.’” Of course, as soon as we started saying that, Lehman would have gone down.

Fannie, Freddie

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created to make homeownership more affordable by subsidizing 30-year mortgages. Fannie Mae was set up in 1938, right after the Great Depression, Freddie Mac in 1970. These were government-sponsored entities, or GSEs. They had noble objectives; they also had major flaws.

The first was that, although they were not owned by the government and although there was no explicit government guarantee, the market assumed that the United States was behind them. There was an implicit guarantee, even though the government said there wasn’t.

The second major flaw was they had weak regulation. Congress in its wisdom, or in this case lack thereof, had deprived the regulator of the same broad powers that a banking regulator had to make judgments. On top of all that, these were mega-institutions, nine times larger than Lehman Brothers. They had grown and grown and grown. The elephant was clearly too big for the tent.

Their independent regulator argued that they had plenty of capital, but we watched them in the market every week selling up to $20 billion of debt securities. If they hadn’t been able to sell their securities, it would spook investors, and you would get massive selloffs and big price declines and losses by all those holding their securities. If they totally collapsed, you would have Armageddon.

Emergency Authority

In July we went to Congress to get emergency authorities to deal with this threat -- authorities we hoped we’d never have to use. But by mid-August, we had discovered that the GSEs had a large capital deficiency. After considering a number of options we concluded that we needed a plan where we actually took over the companies on a Sunday so we could open up Monday under new management. One of the CEOs called me and said, “Hank, what’s going on?”

I said, “I can’t tell you.”

I knew what they would be compelled to do if I talked to them. There is no way those CEOs or boards could agree with anything that undermined their shareholders, because they had a fiduciary duty to protect their shareholders’ interests. So there was no choice but to move quickly to put them into conservatorship, where, in essence, the government backstopped all of their debt securities.

Keeping Secrets

When I briefed President Bush on this, he was fascinated. But he had a hard time believing we were going to be able to keep this secret. I said, “The first thing these guys need to hear is their heads hitting the floor.”

Right after stabilizing Fannie and Freddie, on Sept. 7, it became clear that Lehman was going to be under real pressure from investors. Most of the market participants were watching nervously, but expecting Uncle Ben and Uncle Hank would pull a rabbit out of the hat.

We needed something dramatic to focus people’s attention on the seriousness of the problem. Ben, Tim, and I decided to bring the heads of the major Wall Street firms into the New York Fed on a Friday to let them know the Fed had no authority to guarantee debt or put in capital, and that the government wasn’t going to be there because a loan to a disintegrating investment bank in the midst of a run wouldn’t be successful. We needed a buyer, and we needed these banks to assist the buyer if necessary. Frankly, I thought we were going to need two buyers that weekend, because I had a very strong view that whether Lehman failed or was bought, the market was going to turn immediately to Merrill Lynch.

No Deal

That entire weekend was spent going from one meeting to the other while we talked with BofA and Barclays (BARC), hoping to get a transaction for Lehman Brothers. Sunday morning we came in expecting there to be a deal with Barclays, but we got signs that their U.K. regulator would reject the deal.

That was just a terrible moment for me. Everyone was waiting for Tim and me to come down and report to them, and I wasn’t quite sure what to say. I was gripped with fear. I called Wendy and said, “Wendy, you know, I feel that the burden of the world is on me and that I failed and it’s going to be very bad, and I don’t know what to do, and I don’t know what to say. Please pray for me.”

She went immediately to one of our favorite Bible verses in Second Timothy: “For God hath not given us the spirit of fear, but of power and of love and of a sound mind.” Immediately I felt a sense of peace and renewed confidence. I thanked her and went down to talk to the bankers. We were fortunate that Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch. If they had bought Lehman instead, I believe that Merrill would have failed. That would have been even more harmful.

Changing Lives

I remember waking up very early the morning of Sept. 15 in New York and looking out the window at all the people on the street walking to work. Some I’m sure worked at Lehman. Some worked at other banks. Others didn’t work at any bank. But their lives were about to change in very profound ways.

Lehman intensified the crisis -- it was a symptom, not the cause. I don’t subscribe to the “domino theory” when it comes to Lehman. My former colleague, Ed Lazear, had a line that’s more apt: The crisis was like a giant popcorn popper, and it had been heating these kernels for a year as the crisis went on. Lehman might have been the first to pop, but we knew that weekend that Merrill Lynch and AIG were going to pop next, and many others in the U.S. and Europe were not far behind.

Multiple Problems

That week was like no other week I’ve ever had. We were dealing with multiple problems -- the need to prevent the failure of AIG, the likely impending failure of other financial institutions, the need to prevent the implosion of money-market funds, and the need to go to Congress to request emergency authorities.

We had been working all week on how to request what we needed from Congress. At the heart of it was the ability to buy illiquid assets from financial institutions. We were talking in terms of hundreds of billions of dollars.

It was Thursday evening, Sept. 18, when Ben Bernanke and I met with the congressional leaders. So far many of them had not seen the financial crisis. It hadn’t rippled through to their constituents. Ben and I painted a picture of a financial system which was frozen. Banks weren’t lending to each other. Credit wasn’t flowing normally. I could see 25 percent unemployment, which is what we had after the Great Depression. There was going to be a disaster if we didn’t act immediately.

Very Emotional

At the end of the week when I came up for air, it occurred to me I hadn’t talked to my best friend, my brother Dick. Dick was then a senior vice president, a veteran fixed-income salesman in the Chicago office of Lehman. I called, and he immediately started asking about me. He was very, very worried, because he knows that I take things hard. I told him I didn’t really have time to go into an explanation, but that we had done everything we could to save Lehman. He said, “I know it.” He wasn’t asking about what was happening to his stock or his retirement. He focused on me. I was quite emotional, but I didn’t have much time to be emotional.

Nine days later, on Saturday, Sept. 27, it looked like we were going to get a deal done in Congress to create the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program. But negotiations bogged down and extended late into the night.

Dry Heaves

Now all my life, if I’m really exhausted, I get the dry heaves. It sounds like I’m really sick, because I make a lot of noise. Rahm Emanuel came by. Harry Reid offered to get a doctor. I said I didn’t need it. I play tennis with Wendy, and a couple of times in the hot sun I’ve had the dry heaves. Our opponents thought it was a tactic. Wendy would say, “Hey, get back out here. That’s disgusting.” Of course, it would throw the other people off. In this instance it wasn’t a tactic, but I know that it helped accelerate things.

At least I thought it had. On Monday the House voted down TARP. Barney Frank, attempting to cheer me up, said, “Don’t worry, Hank. Sometimes kids have to run away from home and get hungry before they come back.” TARP did pass on a second vote, but all week that TARP was passing, the situation was worsening in the markets: Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. savings and loan, failed; Wachovia, the sixth-largest bank, was purchased as it was failing; European banks were teetering; and global credit markets had all but stopped functioning for financial institutions.

Changing Strategies

We had gone to Congress with the expectation that we would be buying illiquid assets, but it was clear we needed to do something swifter and even more powerful. So we changed strategies and decided to inject capital directly into the banks.

My own view has always been to admit when you’re wrong and change course quickly. I didn’t have to have long debates with the White House staff about how bad the harm to the economy would be if the financial system went down. President Bush had a good feel, and he understood markets. He basically said, “Holy cow, you’ve told the whole world you’re going to buy illiquid assets. It’s going to be important how you explain it, but of course you’ve got to put capital in the banks.” The best advice he gave me was to do what’s right and ignore politics.

Sunday, Oct. 12, I called nine CEOs from the systemically important banks and asked them to show up at Treasury on Monday afternoon. We would present the program and ask them within a few hours to sign agreements where they would willingly take the capital.

Tallest Midget

Every bank wanted to be the tallest midget: No one wanted to admit they had a problem because they didn’t want to stigmatize themselves. So we designed a program that didn’t separate the healthy banks from the banks under duress, and we moved quickly to inject capital into hundreds of banks to recapitalize our financial system and restore confidence.

The only way we knew to do this was to put forward a program that would be attractive to the financial institutions, so they all would be encouraged to take capital for the good of the country. This was a program unlike any other in history.

All of the banks agreed, and for a short period of time, I breathed a sigh of relief.

The way I read the polls, TARP was more unpopular than torture. We don’t like bailouts in this country. If you take a risk and make money? That’s good. But if you take a risk and the government has to come in and save you? Well, I understood the anger.

I was never able to convince the American people that what we did with TARP was not for the banks. It was for them. It was to save Main Street. It was to save our economy from a catastrophe.

Public Anger

I knew Americans were angry when they thought the banks were hoarding and not lending as much as they would have liked. But how does the government make the banks lend? Even if you nationalize the banks, which we didn’t, do you want the government making lending decisions for the banks? That’s a recipe for disaster.

The other criticism of TARP, just the man-on-the-street feeling about it, was that in addition to not lending, huge bonuses were being paid to some bank executives. That infuriated me -- the sheer cheekiness of it. Forget whether they were legally entitled to their bonuses, it was such a graceless lack of self-awareness and a total lack of understanding about how the rest of the world and the rest of America looked at them.

Bipartisan Work

One of the things that I’m proudest of is that we worked with Democrats and Republicans to get Congress to do some pretty extraordinary things -- twice. First with Fannie and Freddie and then with TARP, all before the system collapsed. The Obama administration took those programs, managed them well, and adapted them to market conditions. We had policy continuity across administrations, and the programs we left them worked. When we look at our flagship TARP bank and insurance company capital program, all the money has come back plus $32 billion. Excluding the Obama administration’s spending program for mortgage relief, the Treasury has already received more than it dispersed from all TARP investment programs.

I get asked all the time, “What’s the likelihood of another financial crisis?” And I begin by saying it’s a certainty. As long as we have markets, as long as we have banks, no matter what the regulatory system is, there will be flawed government policies. Those policies will create bubbles. They will manifest themselves in a financial system no matter how it’s structured and how it’s regulated. But the key thing is to have the tools and the political will to act forcefully to limit a crisis.

Now a number of things that we were forced to do during this crisis made the problem worse, beginning with big banks. To get through the night we needed to encourage consolidation, so today we have bigger banks and more concentration.

Unacceptable Phenomenon

Too-big-to-fail is an unacceptable phenomenon. Thanks to Dodd-Frank, regulators have better tools to deal with the failure of any large financial institution, but more still needs to be done with the shadow-banking markets, which I define to be the money-market funds and the so-called repo market, which supplies wholesale funding to banks.

When I came to Washington, Fannie or Freddie guaranteed or insured roughly half the new mortgages in America. Today about 90 percent of all new mortgages are insured by the government. So today it’s worse. I frankly find it abhorrent to even think about keeping Fannie or Freddie in conservatorship. If we do so, we’re just sowing the seeds of a future crisis.

But overall, do I believe that our financial system is stronger, better capitalized, and better regulated?

I sure do. And at the end of the day, more capital is the best defense against bank failure.

To contact the reporter on this story: Josh Tyrangiel in New York at jtyrangiel@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Wes Kosova at wkosova@bloomberg.net

Wednesday, April 27, 2011

The Curious Case of United Continental (UAL)

6 month TA on UAL
United, despite being an airline with notoriously bad service, and having a rough quarter (net loss in the first quarter widened to $213 million or $0.65 per share from $82 million or $0.49 per share in the prior year, below Wall Street consensus expectation), they recovered nicely in stock price thanks to smaller than expected loss in American Airline. In fact, they rise so much so quickly that they broke the bearish trend and coming right at the resistance level at around 23.5, as shown above.


Looking at fundamental, the huge loss in the first quarter made sense: rapidly rising fuel cost, dwelling economy leading to less passengers going on vacation or business travels, and the unexpected hit from the massive earthquake and subsequently tsunami plus radiation leak in North Japan. All these are big ticket hitter and should affect most international airlines. To add salt to the injury United is just going through merger with Continental and there will be some settling time with the integration, especially on how to cope with the unions.


So what's next? Fundamentally the travel season is beginning, and should help with their profit. Key part to watch is the oil price's movement which will have upside pressure from summer's fuel use (road trips, air conditioning, etc) and the unrest in the middle east. Downside pressure for oil includes European debt crisis and China's heavy hand on curbing inflation. The Japan case is still a mess, but rebuilding takes oil, too.


Technically if UAL breaks the second resistance at 24 then, though weak, they will be going in a bullish trend.


Disclosure: I had net short position on UAL, and no other airline exposure. And I hate United - they should go down and let someone better like Cathay to run it.

Tuesday, April 5, 2011

Market Fear

Have you ever wondered why the "velocity" of price drop usually far exceeds that of price gain? In other words, usually price drops much faster than price appreciation. I mean, aren't traders inherently greedy? Wouldn't they chase up what they seem to like, as much emotion as running in fear? To answer that question, we must probe at psychology of trades, in the field of behavioral finance.

There is a monumental paper titled Prospect Theory written by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky from Princeton in 1979 describing human decision instead of optimal profit maximization utility theory. This paper has been quoted so much that it ranked second of all economic papers ever published. The first one was a statistical tools paper which presently have no additional value of what we have already known. So this Princeton paper can be regarded as the one of the most useful reference in finance and economics.

One of the key take-away from the paper is that people value loss much more than gain, despite equal magnitude in outcome. That is, the perceived loss in my mind for 10 bucks loss is far greater than perceived value of 10 bucks gain. And the reference point moves with one's wealth, so this greater perception of loss is present in most people regardless of the size of their wealth.

In addition, there is a tendency for people to overweight the small probability of loss, leading to a risk-averse attitude towards investment with small risk (probability of loss) and moderate reward.

Overweight of Small Probability of Loss
Notice that there is two discontinuities in the above graph, and that the perceived change of value is quite flat for a large range of probabilities in the middle. In other words, a winning chance of 40% is seemingly equivalent to 60% chance of profit in our mind, even though mathematically they are vastly different.

On the other hand people are also tend to overweight small probability of gain, leading to risk-seeking attitude towards investment with small probability of gain but moderate change of loss.

There is a third area in human psychology regarding risk and profit, and there exists several zones of comfort that is dependent on the size of one's portfolio or wealth, in which more risk is tolerable when the size of that bet is small regarding to the total size of one's wealth. This one is easy to understand, and I will not explain further.

Now let's come back to our original question. What happens when a trader see a group of sell orders showing up on exchange's quote feed? In his mind, a realization of things may go south occurs. Now we are in the region of "potential loss". Once the loss move past a trader's comfort zone (depending on the size of his trade, usually a small swing in prices will move past a day-trader's comfort zone because of the inherent large bet nature of day trading), panic will kick in very quickly. And the fear feeds on themselves as you may notice from the first graph above, that the drop of value falls rather quickly. This explains why price drop as a result of exodus sell would often be much deeper than any other euphoric rise of prices.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Synthetic CDO - what is it?

 Lately a bunch of us were discussing the notorious topic of subprime mortgage debacle, that investment banks created instruments so complicated that even CEOs and board of such banks did not understand how large the risk was. To facilitate discussion, I put together the below as a recipe to construct such monstrous innovation which are so popular and high in demand in 2007 that they went out of subprime mortgages to be packaged.

Construction of a Mortgage Backed Securities Collateralized Debt Obligation (MBS CDO)

1. Bundle up mortgages, can be residential or commercial (or both), into a group of asset that generates revenues using mortgage payouts.

2. These mortgages can come from a variety of sources. When the good ones are taken, worse mortgages have to be considered. Most mortgages do not have good rating, and especially after the good ones are packaged away, subsequent bundles contained a lot of sub-prime mortgages, with a BBB rating (worst).

3. With these bundled up asset, securitize (i.e. issuing shares of) these bundles with the mortgages as backing. Let say there are 10 mortgages, and we can now issue 100 shares representing these mortgages. So each share contains the asset of 1/10 of an average mortgage of these ten. These shares are now called Mortgage Backed Securities. For detail you can go here in Wikipedia for a nice explanation.

4. The MBS can be traded in the market, but since there are so many different type of mortgages, trading these MBS is not very efficient. To solve this problem, a new product called Collateralized Debt Obligation is created by bundling up various MBS together, with the mortgage payment as revenue stream for these vehicles.

5. There are different seniority level (called tranches) in a CDO. The most junior ones are called "first loss" and would take all the loss if some of the mortgages go default. The most senior tranche are protected from such loss, until all the tranches beneath are defaulted. Of course different tranches are priced differently based on the risk carried.

6. For the most senior tranche, usually investment bank would add Credit Default Swap (CDS) with a small payment per year to the CDS issuer. CDS is essentially an insurance policy which the issuer would pay the purchaser a large amount if the underlying product goes default. In return, the purchaser would pay a small premium periodically (like 2.5% for good debt) depending on the risk and likelihood of default of such protected asset. CDS is liquid and can be traded in Over-The-Counter OTC market which is not regulated or monitored by the SEC. Using their statistics model, the CDS issuer (AIG being one of the biggest) considered it to be a very rare event (black swan?) for the most senior tranche to go default, as all mortgages would have to go default in the entire CDO for the most senior tranche to go busted, the risk of such tranche is low, and thus lower CDS premium.

7. Combine the protection of CDS into the CDO and now these structured product would appear very safe and have a new credit rating. A lot of them got rated AAA (best) even though ultimately the asset are mostly subprime mortgages (BBB or lowest rating).

Risk is characterized by the likelihood of such event. If the company is very unlikely to go default, then it is said to have very low risk. It was assumed that it is very unlikely for all subprime mortgages to go default, and in addition also very unlikely for the CDS issuer (AIG) failing to pay back the policy purchaser. Thus presumably these CDO products have very low risk and thus have very high credit rating (AAA, as high as US Treasury Bonds). The problem was that these rare random events are NOT orthogonal (i.e. not uncorrelated). So if one goes, the others go with it in a chain reaction fashion, and trigger further snow ball effect in a downward spiral. Thus the probability of the most senior tranche going bust is no longer a multiple 6-sigma event. A 6-sigma event is loosely borrowing the low risk meaning of six sigma quality where it guarantees that there is a chance of 99.9999999% for the product to pass. Noted that such faulty assumption of orthogonality had already brought down Long Term Capital Management (LTCM, a hedge fund created by Nobel Laureates including the creator of the industry standard Black-Scholes model for option pricing) back in the 90s. Thus it is not entirely honest for the credit agencies to just blame on wrong assumption of their models. They would not, and should not have missed this.

Of course there were lots of profit taking involved (for instance the credit rating agency will get a handsome “registration transaction” fee if the product get a good rating, thus creating incentive to bless the product; in turn if the products have good rating the banks can sell them at a better price).

But that’s just CDO. The demand of these vehicles was so high (high yield and low risk, who doesn’t want it?), they actually went out of mortgages to be packaged as CDOs because there were only a limited number of physical American home buyers. Actual MBS and their CDOs were soon sold out to foreign investors. I am not joking. To satisfy demand, the investment banks created Synthetic CDOs which had no physical backing (i.e. does not have any attachment to anything in the real world) but were just bets against each other with the MBSs described above as reference (**), without actually owning any MBS. In contrast a CDO has real MBS asset backing.

The now famous Goldman Sachs Abascus 2007 (where they created a product so that John Paulson could bet against Goldman's own customers) was a special company (SPV) registered in Cayman Island constructed by these synthetic CDOs "referencing the performance" of a pool of MBS. In turn this vehicle was sliced up into tranches which investors can buy at different price and yield. You can find the details of this company in this Goldman Sachs presentation. Can you imagine being the accountant who filed tax for such “company”?

** An example is the weather future, where farmers can buy to hedge against the risk of their crop yield in case bad weather happens. Obviously you cannot claim or ask for delivery of good/bad weather in such a derivative. The future is just tracking weather as its reference. Weather or mother nature does not care or owe anything to either side of the future trade. It is like gambling which team will win in a soccer match. Actually a lot of ETFs are created this way, without owning any real stocks but just “tracking the performance of the underlying”. Following the same logic if panic sets in again, ETFs may go busted before the real stocks do as the counterparty can no longer fulfill their payment duty, regardless of what may happen to the real companies/market.

For a time CNBC hailed these sophisticated products as the latest great invention being “manufactured in Wall Street”. Anyway the investment communities as a whole were and still are drinking the same kool-aid. If there was no demand, there would be no supply. There were simply too much money out there seeking a place to go. If we are to do a witch hunt, the target would probably be regulator (SEC and Fed) and the credit rating agencies.